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ABSTRACT
“Fighting Without Firing”: Massacre, Tactical Development, and Propaganda at Paoli
and Tappan
This essay examines the effects and tools of the American Revolutionary massacres at
Paoli in 1777, and Tappan in 1778. These massacres were ordered by the same officer,
Major General Charles Grey, and committed by the same soldiers. The essay argues
that committing massacres and defining battles as “massacres” served British and
American patriot causes during the American Revolution. Committing massacres
provided models for tactical innovation and defining battles as massacre was a powerful
propaganda tool for American revolutionaries. The essay secondarily argues that
bayonets, night attacks, and close combat were essential to the creation of these
massacres, and that Charles Grey played a significant role in the proliferation of this
tactic in the American Revolution and subsequent British conflicts.

“My Fellow Slaves”: Identity, Faith, and Space in the Construction of American Slave
Communities in Algiers, 1785 to 1796
This essay explores the creation of communities among American and European slaves
in Algiers from 1785 to 1796. Examination of the narratives of John Foss and James
Cathcart, the only two authentic slave memoirs from Algiers, reveals that American
Protestants forged bonds with European Catholics due to the influences of identity,
faith, and space. The essay argues that American perceptions of identity, the charity
and support of Catholic religious orders, and the sharing of communal space was
essential to the creation of inter-Christian communities among Algerian slaves.
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Chapter 1. Intellectual Biography
In December 2016 I submitted my undergraduate thesis titled, “Reading
Between the Lines: Mutual Knowledge Between the Irish and English in the
Remonstrance of the Irish Princes and the Parliament of 1297,” exploring cultural
exchange and conflict on the Anglo-Irish medieval borderland. I was, and continue to
be, interested in social and religious interaction as well as legal and extra-legal violence
in zones of armed contention. However, I was unsure of where I wanted to continue my
research geographically and temporally. When I applied to the College of William &
Mary, I hoped to explore these themes in the context of the 1630-1641 Providence
Island colony. I decided to shelf that topic to explore my preferred themes in the context
of the American Revolution, a period I had been immersed in through my work at the
Daughters of the American Revolution.
Beginning in Dr. Middleton’s The American Revolution in the fall of 2020, I was
stumped. Three years removed from undergrad and anxious about the safety of my
spouse, a healthcare provider, I developed my thesis later than anticipated. Despite
these setbacks, I wrote “’Fighting without firing’: Massacre, Tactical Development, and
Propaganda at Paoli and Tappan” an investigation into the products of massacre in the
Revolutionary War. My major argument was that committing and defining massacres
served both the patriot and British cause. By examining the engagements at Paoli in
1777, and Tappan in 1778, I argued that battle tactics that encouraged or were
perceived as “massacre” contributed to tactical developments for both British and patriot
forces. Further, defining a battle as “massacre” served as a propaganda tool. British and
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patriot soldiers invoked the memory of massacre to discourage retreat and justify
slaughter.
This topic surprised me. Originally, I had no intention of researching
Revolutionary battles. Instead, I hoped to find a topic better suited to my interests in
religious history. I entered the seminar hoping to research comparative
counterrevolution in the Revolution and the 1793 War in the Vendée. Finding the
subject untenable, but still intrigued by French Revolutionary counterinsurgency, I
began investigating British punitive raids and stumbled upon the character of Charles
Grey. I noticed that Grey repeatedly engaged in battles later defined as “massacres,”
and the tactics used in these battles inspired later patriot “massacres.” I relied heavily
on accounts of Tappan and Paoli written in letters and memoirs of American and British
combatants. Unfortunately, I had to tease further primary source information from
several secondary sources, as the archival material I desired was inaccessible. I hope
to revise this thesis by including Grey’s papers, as well as other archival materials I was
unable to access during the height of the pandemic. Further, I plan on strengthening the
opening section to provide a better framework for the essay.
Moving on to Dr. Grasso’s seminar on the Early American Republic, I knew I
wanted to explore religious exchange or conflict. I was, however, far less familiar with
the historiography on religion in the Early American Republic. Intrigued by several
readings on American slavery during the semester and inspired by an interest in the
religious dynamics of piracy (originally with the Providence Island Company) I
researched the capture and enslavement of American sailors in North Africa from 17851796. In researching Americans in North African captivity, I found that the historiography
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on enslaved American communities was limited. Christine Sears, who addressed the
actions and contributions of these communities, did not explore how these communities
were formed. Rather, when discussing community, she emphasized a difference in
American and European experiences of slavery in North Africa and asserted that
community was limited and frequently broken. Intrigued by this argument, and having
read some fictional and authentic primary sources on the subject, I began exploring
theories of community creation and attempted to apply these theories to AlgerianAmerican slaves. My research culminated in the thesis, “’My Fellow Slaves’: Identity,
Faith, and Space in the Construction of American Slave Communities in Algiers, 1785 to
1796.” In this work I argued that American perceptions of identity, the contributions of
Catholic religious orders, and the occupation of communal spaces fostered community
between American and European slaves in Algiers. In researching and writing this
project, I relied on authentic written accounts of Algerian captivity. I hoped to investigate
fictional literature on slavery in Algiers, but I found that most fictional accounts of North
African slavery eschewed state-owned slavery in the cities for tales of personal slaves.
As such, I relied heavily on the narratives of John Foss and James Cathcart, two
American sailors enslaved in Algiers. I also employed newspaper extracts of letters
when relevant.
I was proud of the product of my research, but there are several changes I intend
to make to strengthen this paper for publication. First, I was unsure on how to
contextualize my study, and as such I believe my conclusion posits many unrelated and
unsupported claims about the impact of American captives in Algiers. I plan on
investigating the impact of Algerian slavery and Algerian slave narrative in fostering
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Euro-American unity and strengthening the claims I make in my conclusion.
Additionally, I plan to further clarify my use of sources. I write that the genre of the North
African slave narrative was prolific from 1790-1810, and mention the republication of
various narratives in that period. However, my reasoning for emphasizing James
Cathcart and John Foss’s accounts is weak. Further, I need to elaborate on why
Cathcart’s account is relevant despite being published a century after the events.
Overall, I hope to clarify and contextualize this work better, and emphasize that the
research is on a small community in Algiers, and may not result in broader changes in
America.
These two research papers focus on drastically different subjects and themes.
The only bond linking these two works is personal interest. I have, however,
strengthened my understanding of those interests, and hope to find a geographical or
temporal focus in the future. Additionally, I have confirmed that my primary interest are
socio-religious interaction, conflict, and their convergence. I am keen to move beyond
digitized sources, and to strengthen my research with the addition of archival material.
Through these research projects I have confirmed my interests, expanded my
understanding of historical theory, and been exposed the periods and subjects I did not
foresee. Perhaps I will return to the shackled slaves in Algiers, or to the bayonetted
bodies at Paoli, and expand my research in those topics. But for now, I remain unsure
of where history will bring me next.
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Chapter 2. “Fighting Without Firing”: Massacre, Tactical Development, and
Propaganda at Paoli and Tappan
Paoli Memorial Grounds is home to a modest, eroded memorial obelisk erected
in 1817, upstaged later by a grand obelisk in 1877, bearing descriptions of the
“American Soldiers who were the victims of cold-blooded cruelty in the well-known Paoli
Massacre.”1 Much effort is taken to remind visitors of the harrowing experience of these
slaughtered Americans. The vestiges of revolutionary propaganda survive here, the
plaques claimed Paoli to be the birthplace of the first battle cry of the American
Revolution – “Remember Paoli!”2 Signs relayed the quotes of soldiers who participated
in Paoli. These combatants described “a Dreadful scene of havock,” that created a
legacy of fire, suffering, and death. 3 But what other consequences did this battle, and
other British “massacres” like it have on the revolutionary world?
We should begin by defining massacre. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
massacre as, “The indiscriminate and brutal slaughter of people or (less commonly)
animals; carnage, butchery, slaughter in numbers;” This differs slightly from MerriamWebster, which offers, “the act or an instance of killing a number of usually helpless or
unresisting human beings under circumstances of atrocity or cruelty” and “an act of
complete destruction.” Massacre is often favored to describe circumstances in line with
the latter. Americans hear massacre and imagine redcoats gunning down unarmed

1

Kevin Fowler, Paoli Obelisk 1, 2020, Paoli Battlefield Historical Park,
https://www.flickr.com/photos/190864204@N02/50554835993/
2
Kevin Fowler, Remember Paoli Info, Paoli Battlefield Historical Park,
https://www.flickr.com/photos/190864204@N02/50554837483/
3
Kevin Fowler, Paoli Info 2, Paoli Battlefield Historical Park,
https://www.flickr.com/photos/190864204@N02/50626165038
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patriots in Boston, or perhaps the wanton slaughter committed by the Imperial Japanese
Army in Nanking. Infamous historical massacres encourage readers to view these
butcheries as acts committed against the unarmed. Massacre, too, is frequently coupled
with genocide, strengthening the image of violence against the defenseless.
This definition can be molded to fit circumstance. Military defeats have been
painted as massacres. Engagements in which both sides were armed and disposed to
kill, can adopt the definition of massacre when an opponent routes or meets and
unexpected disaster. Historians have long fought back against military engagements
being defined as massacres. George Otto Trevelyan in 1922 denied the existence of a
massacre at the battle of Paoli, decrying that the battle had been “unfairly and almost
absurdly” misdefined. 4 Armstrong Starkey and Thomas McGuire disagreed with
Trevelyan’s assessment of massacre, claiming that the British scorned conventional
military morality and committed a massacre at Paoli. Historians contesting the label of
massacre is a prominent aspect of the historiography of atrocity. This work will not focus
on the classifications of historians, but the description and use of massacre by patriots
and Tories in the American Revolution. My scholarship is, as would be described by
Ben Rubin, as a “treatment of atrocity” focusing on the events and aftermath of “specific
events for which atrocity rhetoric becomes an important element.” 5
There were several “massacres” born out of military defeats in the American
Revolution. What are the consequences of these massacres? To assess this question, I
will examine two minor engagements won by British forces in the American Revolution –

4

George Otto Trevelyan, The American Revolution (London, 1922), Vol. 4, 234
Ben Rubin, “The Rhetoric of Revenge: Atrocity and Identity in the Revolutionary Carolinas”
Journal of Backcountry Studies 5, no. 2 (2010), 5
5
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The Battle of Paoli in 1777 and the Battle of Tappan, otherwise known as the Baylor
Massacre, in 1778. I will address them chronologically and examine the effects of each
conflict. Examination of these battles will show that there was value in defining and
committing massacre in the American Revolution. Committing massacres served both
patriot and the British, as it could provide models for tactical innovation, and defining
battles as massacre was a powerful propaganda tool for American revolutionaries, used
to encourage patriots in battle.
I have chosen these two battles, typically defined as massacres, because they
are engagements against armed combatants. Additionally, these two battles were won
by close combat. These battles provide intriguing insights into the effects and value of
massacres in the revolutionary world. One is inclined to ask why more infamous
massacres, like the Boston Massacre, are not addressed in this work. Certainly, the
Boston Massacre provided an exceptional propaganda tool for patriot printers and
agitators. The Boston Massacre is, however, the subject of innumerable works
investigating all angles of the event. Not only do I wish to investigate some of these
lesser-known massacres in order to fill in the periphery of literature on revolutionary
massacre, but the massacres I wish to examine were battles fought between armed
combatants, not acts of accidental state terrorism. Additionally, these battles were
selected because the situations in which they occurred were similar – in these two
battles soldiers attacked at night and used tactics and weapons in ways that
encouraged intense violence.
This work relies heavily on the memoirs and journals of individuals who fought in
or received and transmitted information about the battles. Some letters are used when
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available. Unfortunately the personal papers of several important individuals involved
are inaccessible at this time. Charles Grey’s papers would have potentially been a boon
to this research, but as they are unavailable, I am indebted to the work of Paul David
Nelson’s Sir Charles Grey, First Early Grey: Royal Soldier, Family Patriarch.
Additionally, some archival material on the battle of Paoli has not been digitized. As
Thomas J. McGuire’s Battle of Paoli makes excellent use of these sources, I will be
using his extensive research on the battle to fill in the gaps of my research.
Tool of Massacre
Before examining the effects of these massacres, it may be prudent to review the
primary weapon used in these battles. What tools were at the disposal of British forces
that would allow a victory to devolve into a massacre? The battles in which they
occurred were military victories for British, victories that were won by the sword or
bayonet by men who held deep grudges against their patriot opponents.
In the two massacres investigated here the bayonet and sword are used
extensively. The bayonet, a blade attached to the muzzle of a long gun, was first used
with the plug bayonet by the turn of the eighteenth-century, eventually removing the
need for long pikes and other stabbing weapons. 6 In his 1783 work on tactics and
discipline, military veteran William Dalrymple described the mixed effectiveness of
bayonets in battle. The weapon was found to be useful as a counter to mounted
opponents, as well as a boon during the “attack and defense of retrenchments” or
fortifications.7 The musket with a fixed bayonet, however, was not an easy weapon to
use; Dalrymple wrote “the bayonet being placed at the end of the firelock, renders it a
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Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Chicago, 2001), 268
William Dalrymple, Tackticks (Dublin, 1783), 113-114

9
weapon most unwieldy, and with which it is not easy to fence.” 8 During a bayonet
charge the unwieldiness of the weapon led to “impracticability of two Battalions,
opposed to each other…[in a] close encounter.”9 To avoid fighting with cumbersome
weapons and a lack of armor “one body must give way before they get into action.” 10
The bayonet held its value not necessarily in its effectiveness in close combat, but the
psychological effect of a charge. As G.J. Guthrie, a surgeon and witness to Napoleonic
combat recalled, a bayonet charge usually ended before the adversaries met, as one
side fled.11 The belief that bayonet charges often led to inconclusion or route was
echoed in American newspapers published during the American Civil war, as the
Philadelphia Saturday Evening Post declared on the “Delusions as to Bayonet Wounds”
that “opposing regiments, when formed in line, and charging with fixed bayonets, never
meet and struggle hand to hand… for the very best possible reason, that one side turns
round and runs away.”12
Despite the mixed effectiveness of the bayonet in battle, the British military elite
revered the weapon. British officers like Burgoyne were hyper confident of a British
soldier’s effectiveness with the bayonet. The idea that “the bayonet in the hands of the
valiant is irresistible” permeated the British officer corps.13 The officer’s perceived
irresistibility of the British soldier with the bayonet was actively fostered among the
troops. According to Matthew H. Spring, British soldiers were known to wait for signs of
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Dalrymple, Tackticks, 114
Dalrymple, Tackticks, 114
10
Dalrymple, Tackticks, 114
11
G.J. Guthrie, “Lectures on Some of the More Important Points in Surgery” Medical Times 17
(1847-1848), 305
12
“Delusions as to Bayonet Wounds,” Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 9, 1861, 6
13
James Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Book (Albany, 1884), 74
9

10
fear among rebel troops and to capitalize on the fear by bayonet charge. Upon seeing
signs of disorder among rebels, such as the unsteadiness in the bearing of arms, the
British infantry charged and attempted to further frighten and confuse patriot forces. 14
Actual violence in pitched battle by bayonet may have been limited to stragglers, and as
the previously mentioned insights of G.J. Guthrie and William Dalrymple, opponents
usually preferred to avoid close quarters combat with the bayonet. Here there is an
important difference between the field battle and massacres that we will now introduce.
At Paoli and Tappan, the opponents were surprised and pursued by both bayonet
wielding soldiers and mounted forces, which promoted an unusual amount of violence
during and after the battles.

Paoli
In 1777 the British army under William Howe pursued George Washington’s men
through the Delaware valley, in what would later become Chester County. Martin
Hunter, an officer serving with the British 52nd Regiment of Foot light infantry under the
command of General Charles Grey, recalled that Washington crossed the Schuylkill
River and ordered General Anthony Wayne to stay behind to attack the British flank. 15
The soldiers under Wayne and Washington, following the failure at Brandywine, feared
the worst. William Knox, brother of patriot general Henry Knox, complained of lacking
shelter and supplies, of repeated defeats, and of failure to meet with favorable

14

See Matthew H. Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonet Only: The British Army on Campaign in
North America, 1775-1783 (Norman, 2008) for insight into British bayonet charges during the
American Revolution.
15
Martin Hunter, The Journal of Gen. Sir Martin Hunter and Some Letters of his Wife, Lady
Hunter (Edinburgh, 1894), 30

11
engagements with the British during the Philadelphia campaign. 16 Wayne’s position had
been discovered, and he received information of potential assault by the British. He
was, however, determined to remain as he was “awaiting the arrival of Gen. William
Smallwood and Col. Mordecai Gist, along with 2,100 Maryland militiamen and three iron
cannons,” to accompany him, and decided to holdfast until Smallwood’s arrival.17
Wayne had the area scouted and established pickets on the exterior of his camp to
prepare for potential British assault that night. 18
On the night of September 20, 1777, Martin Hunter prepared himself for a night
raid on the camp of General Anthony Wayne. General Grey informed Major Thomas
Maitland, commander of the 2nd Battalion of Light Infantry, that the assault would be a
surprise. To maintain the surprise the British were instructed to remove their firing
pieces or ammunition, and attack with bayonet. Hunter and 1,200 comrades marched
out of camp at 8pm on the evening of the 20th.19 The sentries guarding the exterior of
Wayne’s camp were alerted by distant shots from mounted scouts, but alertness did not
prevent their fateful end.
The absence of British shots escalated the confusion of the night assault, and led
to calamitous friendly fires between patriot pickets, believing the shots in the dark to be
British soldiers.20 Hunter and the light infantry charged through the woods towards the

16

William Knox, Account of the campaign of September and October 1777 including a report on
the Battle of Paoli. Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History. GLC02437.00654
17
Thomas McGuire, Battle of Paoli (Mechanicsburg, 2000), 62
18
See British Camp at Trudruffrin the 18th to the 21st of September 1777. With the Attack Made
by Major general Grey Against the Rebels near White Horse Tavern. On the 20 th of September.
Map. London: Faden Charing Cross, 1778. https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3824t.ar134200/ for
map of battle plans and picket locations
19
McGuire, Battle of Paoli, 70
20
McGuire, Battle of Paoli, 76
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patriot encampment, catching some soldiers by surprise. In a hellish scene, the camp
was put to the flame and bayonet – “the light infantry bayonetted every man they came
up with; this, with the cries of the wounded, formed, altogether the most dreadful scene I
have ever beheld.”21 Anthony Wayne attempted to conduct a retreat of the patriot
forces, which quickly devolved into a bloody rout. The British light infantry pursued the
fleeing revolutionaries; they “stabbed great numbers and pressed on their rear till it was
thought prudent to order them to desist.”22
The brutality of this midnight raid is undeniable; those who survived and heard of
it recorded tales of abject horror. Surviving victims of the assault were reported to have
multiple bayonet wounds. Captain Andrew Irvine received seventeen stabs and
lacerations, and Private Jacob Justice’s injuries “were so severe that he was originally
listed as killed.”23 Some soldiers, like Private William Leary and Captain Robert Wilson,
received both bayonet and blunt force wounds from musket beatings; such a blow had
broken Wilson’s jaw.24 William Hutchinson, a patriot residing in Chester County,
Pennsylvania, was stationed at a tavern near the battle of Paoli. Two days after the
battle, a patriot suffering from “forty-six distinct bayonet wounds” was found in the local
woods in which he had been dying for some twenty-four hours. The victim “had neither
hat, shows, nor stockings, and his legs and feet were covered with mud and sand which
had been fastened to his skin by mixing with his own blood as it ran down his limbs.” 25

21

Hunter, The Journal of Gen. Sir Martin Hunter, 31
John André, André’s Journal: An Authentic Record of the Movements and Engagements of
the British Army in America…As Recorded from Day to Day (Boston, 1903), vol. 1, 94
23
McGuire, Battle of Paoli, 101
24
McGuire, Battle of Paoli, 101
25
John C. Dann, ed., The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness Accounts of the War for
Independence (Chicago, 1980), 150
22
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The “indiscriminate and brutal slaughter of people” is evident at Paoli – the nature of a
surprise close combat encounter encouraged British soldiers to act with exceeding
violence.

Tappan
The engagement at Tappan occurred just one year after the Battle of Paoli, with
the same British commanding officers and units involved. After returning to New Jersey
from a raiding expedition in New England, General Grey and several other British
generals were instructed to conduct foraging expeditions to antagonize the patriots into
battle.26 While crossing the Hudson the British encountered a group of patriot militiamen
and dragoons under the command of General William Winds and Colonel George
Baylor. A plan was hatched by the British to conduct an encirclement and surprise
attack on the encampment of the patriot forces. On the evening of September 27, 1778,
Winds was informed by British deserters of the attack and retreated, “but did not notify
Baylor that the latter officer was completely on his own.” 27 General Grey and the
Second Light Infantry which accompanied him at Paoli maintained the same distinct
silence he had found successful at his previous surprise attack. The light infantry
surrounded the buildings Baylor’s men were sleeping in and let out a cry to announce
the slaughter as they did at Paoli.28 Martin Hunter, serving with the Second Light
Infantry, scoffed at the foolhardiness of Baylor’s men in his journal, “so perfectly secure

26

Paul David Nelson, Sir Charles Grey, First Early Grey: Royal Soldier, Family Patriarch
(London, 1996), 49
27
Nelson, Sir Charles Grey, 50
28
André, André’s Journal, vol. 2, 47
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did the enemy think themselves, that not even a sentry was posted.” 29 Again, as in
Paoli, Hunter wrote that “not a shot was fired” during the engagement, and “the whole
regiment, except a very few that were bayonetted, were taken prisoners.”30
Here Hunter seems to underplay the violence undertaken that night. To start,
several of those captured suffered and later died from bayonet wounds. Most notably
the commanding officers of the patriot dragoons were both bayonetted while attempting
to hide in a chimney.31 Patriot victims of the assault claim to have heard some British
officers refuse to take quarter. Dr. David Griffith, a patriot surgeon from Virginia,
recorded the testimony of several victims of the battle; one Southward Cullency, who
received twelve bayonet wounds, claimed “he and all the Men asked for Quarter, which
was refused.”32 Thomas Talley, being captured by the British, was “stripped…of his
breeches” and later received six bayonet wounds after capture. 33 The stripping involved
in the attack also occurred at Paoli, as mentioned in the recollections of William
Hutchinson. The burial site of several Baylor dragoons, excavated in 1967, offers further
evidence of the brutality committed. One of the dragoons, likely 18 or 19 years of age,
was found with an oval fracture on the side of his cranium. Investigations found that the
victim was prone when he received the wound, likely caused by a blunt force beating
with the butt of a musket.34 Despite the small scale of the engagement, with only 104

29

Hunter, The Journal of Gen. Sir Martin Hunter, 43
Hunter, The Journal of Gen. Sir Martin Hunter, 43
31
Thomas Demarest, "The Baylor Massacre: Some Assorted Notes and Information,"
Bergen County History Annual (1971), 44
32
Thomas Demarest, "The Baylor Massacre: Some Assorted Notes and Information,"
Bergen County History Annual (1971), 44
33
Demarest “The Baylor Massacre: Some Assorted Notes and Information,"44
34
D. Bennett Mazur and Wayne M. Daniels, The Massacre of Baylor’s Dragoons, September
28, 1778: Excavation of the Burial Site (1968), 24
30
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patriot soldiers billeted at the farm with 16 killed, 16 wounded, and 38 imprisoned, many
perceived the assault as barbarous and unreasonably violent. 35

Massacre and Tactical Innovation
The massacres at Paoli and Tappan are immediately notable for their bloodiness.
Regardless of the number of killed, captured, or wounded, the individuals who suffered
at these battles endured horrific suffering. Even British soldiers like Lt. Colonel Charles
Stuart viewed what may have been an impressive victory at Tappan sullied by “the
barbarity of [the Light Infantry’s] behaviour.” 36 These massacres should be recognized
for their brutality, but they should also be recognized for the tactical prowess with which
they were conducted. The tactics of exclusive bayonet use at night employed by the
soldiers and officers at Paoli and Tappan contained dangerous potential. Despite the
gruesome nature of the tactic, it showed a potential for extraordinary victories—few
attackers perished, and victims lost most of their supplies to the attackers. Officers and
soldiers from both sides learned from these experiences and mimicked aspects of it
elsewhere.
As noted by Paul David Nelson in Charles Grey’s biography, Grey previously
experienced firsthand the surprise attacks at Minden and Klosterkamp while serving in
the Twentieth Regiment of Foot in the Seven Years War. At Minden on August 1, 1759,
Grey witnessed the confusion of a converging surprise attack, in which both the French
commander Louis de Contades and the opposing Anglo-German commanders planned

35

Nelson, Sir Charles Grey, 52
E Stuart Wortley, A Prime Minister and his Son: From the Correspondence of the 3rd Earl of
Bute and of Lt. General the Hon. Sir Charles Stuart (New York, 1925), 137
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surprise attacks to be launched the same evening. Confusion reigned during the early
morning battle, commanders made uninformed decisions, and both sides were unaware
of the volume of enemy combatants and their locations.37 Night bled into morning, and
the Anglo-German coalition bested the French, who took the opportunity to retreat
before accumulating extensive losses. At Minden, the intent to surprise was replaced by
confusion, musket and cannon fire quickly alerted the opponent of the location of
assaults. The attempted surprise Battle of Klosterkamp (also called Campen) a year
later displayed similar issues in maintaining the element of surprise. At Minden, Duke
Charles William Ferdinand of Brunswick planned to attack a French force “encamp[ed]
behind the Convent at Campen” before the French could receive reinforcements the
following day.38 While approaching after 10pm, the Prince of Brunswick found it
necessary to “dislodge [the French] corps which occupied the Convent of Campen, at
about half a league’s distance from the front of their army.” Removing the French threat
from the monastery, from the perspective of Sir Charles Hotham, who served with the
British under Brunswick, “could not be done without firing some musket shot, which
gave the alarm to [the French camp].” The exchange of musket fire provided the French
with valuable time to arrange a defense, obliging the Anglo-German to retreat before
accruing further losses.39 The surprise attack, in the end, collapsed. The failure to
maintain silence ruined the surprise, and allowed opposing forces treasured time to
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Frank McLynn, 1759: The Year Britain Became Master of the World (New York, 2004), 270273
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organize a defense or conduct organized retreats. At the Battles of Paoli and Tappan,
Charles Grey attempted to correct the faults of Minden and Klosterkamp.
Before the Battle of Paoli, Grey ordered his men to attack with bayonets only.
This was his first solution to the issue of surprise. Popular claims abound that Grey
ordered that the flint, used to fire the weapon by creating a spark in the gunpowder pan,
be removed from his soldiers muskets before battle in order to force the use of the
bayonet. However, evidence on this is mixed; Martin Hunter’s commanding officer Major
Thomas Maitland received the order to “draw their pieces” 40 before battle but refused
and pledged that his men would not fire.41 John André, also at the battle, wrote “no
soldier … was suffered to load, those who could not draw their pieces took out the
flints.”42 Other contemporaries such as Major Carl Baurmeister, aide-de-camp to several
officers involved in the Philadelphia campaign, heard that Grey ordered his men not to
load their muskets.43 Grey’s soldiers, either unloaded or without flint, all the same
attacked at both Paoli and Tappan without firing a shot.
To speak to its efficacy, British casualties were minimal in both engagements. At
Paoli, John André reported only three British deaths and at most five wounded, while
Martin Hunter claimed “not more than twenty men killed and wounded. 44 45 Hunter and
André make no mention of casualties at Tappan. At Paoli Thomas McGuire’s research
revealed a total of three deaths from the light infantry, an additional two British
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dragoons, and eight wounded.46 Compared to the patriot losses, these numbers were
staggeringly low. Reports of rebel losses at Paoli varied wildly; Captain John Montrésor,
attached to the camp of William Howe at the time, wrote “between 4 or 500 [rebels
were] put to the Bayonet and the rest fled except about 100 that were taken prisoner.” 47
Hunter recalled “four hundred and sixty of the enemy … lying dead the next morning.” 48
Baurmeister reported “100 bayonetted, some 70 wounded, 82 taken prisoners.” 49 John
André, who accompanied General Charles Grey into battle, reported “near 200 must
have been killed, and a great number wounded. Seventy-one Prisoners were brought
off, forty of them badly wounded.”50 As aide-de-camp to General Grey, André likely had
an accurate representation of the volume of prisoners taken. Patriot casualties at
Tappan were similarly one-sided; André reported that the “whole corps within six or
eight men were killed or taken prisoners.”51 Casualty reports varied for both the British
and patriot reporters, and although casualties were difficult to track the losses were
considered significant.
Material gains from these massacres further demonstrate the effectiveness of
Grey’s silent night assault. John Montrésor reported the capture of “nine loaded wagons
with 4 horses each, and … their cattle.”52 Baurmeister report of the battle includes the
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British confiscation of “about one thousand” muskets discarded during the massacre. 53
British troops nearly captured the four cannons and additional munition wagons during
the attack, but these carts escaped before the melee reached them. 54 The material
gains from Tappan were more limited, as the victims of the assault were members of a
smaller detachment. Here the light infantry captured the “the horses, saddles,
accoutrements, &c” used by the patriot dragoons.55 Neither André nor Hunter note the
number of horses and supplies captured. Considering Paul David Nelson’s casualty
estimates, with around 70 patriots killed, captured, or wounded, of the 104 members of
the unit, it is likely that the British captured upwards of 70 horses and related riding
supplies.
Disciplined silence led to resounding success in the field, visible in the relative
lack of casualties and the volume enemies and supplies destroyed or captured. These
battles demonstrated for British and American soldiers and officers the potent
effectiveness (and potential for excessive brutality) of disciplined, silent bayonet night
assault. Generals Wayne and Grey both replicated the tactics used at Paoli and Tappan
in later battles and campaigns.
On July 16, 1779, a year after Tappan, and two years after Paoli, General
Anthony Wayne conducted a surprise night attack on the British outpost at Stony Point,
New York. General Washington wrote to Wayne prior to the battle to detail the plan. As
in Paoli and Tappan, the attack would be conducted close to midnight by a force of light
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infantry.56 Wayne was instructed by Washington to attack the British camp “with fixed
bayonets and muskets unloaded.” 57 Officers made similar threats of drastic
consequences for those who fired their weapons during the assault; “if any man
attempted to load his piece… or retreat, he was instantly to be put to death by the
officer or soldier next to him.” 58 As in Tappan and Paoli, the close combat was brutal
and violent. William Hull, an American officer who fought alongside the light infantry in
the assault on Stony Point, recorded his account of “dreadful slaughter owing to the
fierce and obstinate resistance of the enemy.” 59 Hull stated that the British did not
surrender until they had suffered nearly one hundred casualties, but as with Paoli, it is
impossible to know if the victims of the assault attempted surrender before the patriot
assault concluded. Modern casualty estimates claim the British lost 63 soldiers, with an
additional 70 wounded in battle and 543 prisoners. 60 The patriots, as in the massacres,
suffered relatively few casualties; 15 killed in actions and 83 wounded. 61 Despite the
number of dead and wounded at the hands of the bayonet, in a similar style of surprise
bayonet combat as at Paoli and Tappan, patriots saw the battle as an example of “valor,
perseverance and superior physical strength” of the Americans. 62
Washington and Wayne’s experimentation with Grey’s tactic used at Paoli and
Tappan yielded some degree of success. A successful assault and lessons learnt about
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the value of this style of assault. Grey took his successes further. In 1793 the British
organized an expedition to the Caribbean intended to capture the French islands of
Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Lucia, and Saint-Domingue to “deprive republican France
of her last source of revenue.” 63 The expedition left Portsmouth on November 26, 1793
with 7,000 soldiers, 10,000 fewer than he had originally been promised. 64 With his
limited supply of soldiers, Grey informed his subordinates that they would use the same
tactics he had employed in the American Revolution to win the campaign. On January
24, 1794, during the first month of the campaign, Grey encouraged his soldiers to rely
on their bayonets. Grey informed them that lack of ammunition was not cause for
retreat, as they had with them “the bayonet…the best and most effectual weapon in the
hands of a gallant British soldier.”65 He also informed them of his tactical use of the
bayonet during night attacks, in such surprise attacks “ammunition and firing are totally
out of the question, and the bayonet is ever to be preferred.” 66
Grey defended his order by citing personal experiences the value of the bayonet
night attack. First, he claimed that it “conceals your numbers.” 67 The confusion of
numbers of attackers can be seen in the records of American survivors of Paoli and
Tappan, where the actual number of British soldiers involved in the attack becomes
exorbitantly high. Second, Grey noted “the enemy direct their fire wherever they see or
hear fire, consequently fire upon eachother while you are concealed, and they fall an
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easy prey.”68 A friendly fire event very similar to this was recorded between two patriot
pickets outside Wayne’s camp at Paoli.69 Col. Thomas Hartley, an American present at
Paoli, wrote of the rampant friendly fire at Paoli, “many were killed … some times by
Enemy’s and some Times by Friends.”70 He concluded this section of his orders by
declaring his knowledge of this from his “own repeated experience” and assuaging his
soldiers by claiming “if [the orders are] strictly adhered to, it will seldom, if ever, fail of
success.”71 Grey understood the tactical potential and effects of the strategy he
experimented with at Paoli and Tappan. As in the American Revolution, the ordered
exclusive use of the bayonet had bloody consequences.
Cooper Willyams, chaplain of the expedition’s flagship Boyne, recorded several
bayonet attacks during Grey’s West Indian campaign. One attempted assault on
February 16, 1794 directed at the artillery emplacement at Morne Rouge bears similarity
to Paoli, as soldiers were ordered to remove “all their flints” for the 2 AM assault.72
Willyams records several minor bayonet assaults, but does not witness the violence of
the battles until the aftermath of the battle at Fort Fleur d'Epée, Guadeloupe on April 12,
1794. Here the British planned an early morning amphibious attack with bayonet only.
Sailors were also instructed to join battle and make exclusive use of swords and pikes. 73
Attacking at 5 AM, British soldiers quickly advanced, killing the pickets outside the fort
and meeting fierce resistance at the gates.74 Willyams reminds the reader here of the
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violence seen at Paoli and Tappan, “a scene of dreadful conflict took place: the enemy
… were put to the sword in great numbers.”75 Following the victory, British troops
continued to pursue the fleeing French, driving them nearly 35 miles to Basse-Terre.76
Willyams decided to visit the captured fortress that day; what he witnessed corresponds
with the brutality recorded at Grey’s American massacres. At the fort’s gate he
encountered “a heap of the slain, who all died by the sword or bayonet” – inside the
fortress “the destruction appeared more dreadful.” He witnessed “a multitude of
miserable wretches expiring of their wounds” and amongst the carnage sat Sir Charles
Grey, “writing his dispatches on a table.”77 At Fleur d'Epée forty-four British troops were
lost, compared to the French two hundred and fifty. 78 Another unnamed massacre
occurred at Trinité, where Major General Thomas Dundas attacked the French with
bayonets. A British dispatch from the expedition headquarters at Riviere Sallée
celebrated the “great slaughter” that took place during the rout. 79
The bayonet-exclusive night assault was something significantly different from
previous patriot attacks, and the actions that were undertaken during the planning and
assault bear striking similarities to British actions at Paoli and Tappan. This style of
assault was new for soldiers and officers alike. One American soldier was put to death
during battle for loading his musket and intending to fire, telling his superior officer that
he “did not understand fighting without firing.”80 In the British East Indian expedition of
1794, Grey’s insistence on the value of the bayonet attack, and the assurance he
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provided to his soldiers that “it will seldom, if ever, fail of success” if done properly,
displays a need to justify this unusual strategy to soldiers unfamiliar with its use.
The battles at Tappan and Paoli were not planned as massacres, neither was
Stony Point or the battles of the British West Indian Campaign of 1794. Historians have
noted that Grey’s use of bayonet night attacks were intended as an “effective shock
action” and to gain a “psychological edge [for] those on the offensive.” 81 However, these
night attacks created the opportunity for extreme violence that was difficult to restrain.
Soldiers participating in these night assaults had been assured that no enemy was their
equal, and that their use of the bayonet was superior to all. Commanders in all
circumstances train their soldiers, as Amelia Green explains, to “increase combatants’
predisposition to violence.”82 To win battles and wars “commander must, and do,
cultivate violence to succeed.”83 But in fostering violent predisposition soldiers become
more willing to commit unrestrained and unordered acts of violence.84 The dark of a
night assault and permission given to soldiers to attack violently and with close combat
only create the perfect scenario for outbursts of unrestrained violence. Perhaps the
extreme violence of these battles further encouraged the enemy to flee, and Grey and
other commanders used this tactic with complete knowledge of its murderous potential.
As it stands, it is not clear whether commanders learned from Paoli the value of the
tactics used, or the value of the violent aftermath. Grey’s reputation having been
damaged by his soldiers’ conduct at Paoli, likely developed his strategies despite the
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potential for massacre. The victories at Paoli and Tappan, despite their brutality, were
also military engagements, and presented opportunities for soldiers and officers to learn
from the victory and perfect this type of attack.

Propaganda
The battles at Tappan and Paoli resulted in a bevy of tales of horror and cruelty,
as well as bravery and strength. Depending on the perspective, the retold events of
battle could change from legitimate conflict to massacre. For the patriots, this
propaganda focused on the cruelty of the British, attempted to promote a belief that the
British took no prisoners, and deserved retribution for the misdeeds of Paoli and
Tappan.
Some reported brutality of the battles of Paoli and Tappan can seem absurd,
fictitious, or otherwise excessive. This phenomenon is seen in the records of both battle
survivors and those who heard about the battle. For example, the account of John
Robert Shaw offers a tale of the barbarity at Tappan that is not verifiable from other
sources or archaeological evidence. John Robert Shaw was a British drummer
stationed at Long Island, but was not present at Tappan. However, he believed in and
regurgitated tales of the battle believing the events to be true. He claimed that his
regiment was close enough to hear the “screams of the hapless victims whom our
savage fellow soldiers were butchering.”85 He claimed that the first casualty of the
surprise was a sentry who had fallen asleep outside; a British officer, finding him,
“instantly cut off his head.”86 He claimed that “some were seen having their arms cut off,
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and others with their bowels hanging out crying for mercy.”87 In his tale, the killed and
wounded amounted to 250 patriots. He concluded this section with a rousing declaration
of British calamity, “let Britain boast no more of her honour, her scince [sic] and
civilization; but with shame hide her head in the dust; her fame is gone; Tapaan [sic] will
witness against her.”88 There are immediately evident several issues to his account. To
begin, he claimed that the first murder was committed by “one of the officers of the
grenadiers,” when in fact there were no grenadiers present during the assault. 89
Thomas Maitland’s Second Light Infantry conducted the attack at Tappan, as evidenced
by Martin Hunter, who served with the light infantry and was present at the battle. 90 Dr.
David Griffith, surgeon and chaplain who examined the wounded after Tappan, makes
no mention of victims having suffered loss of limb, only the expected stabs and
lacerations of a bayonet. 91 The battles of Tappan and Paoli were conducted under strict
orders of silence, as such it is difficult to imagine any officer believing it practical to
attempt to behead a sleeping soldier instead of dispatching him in a similar manner to
the other victims at Tappan, with the use of bayonet or musket butt. Shaw’s account of
the battle at Tappan, like others concerning Tappan and Paoli, are not significant for
dubious stories they present but for the propagandized story it markets. As Shaw was
not present at the battle, information he told in his account were secondhand. He
believed the tale enough to record it in his memoir and to moralize the event, despite his
retelling inconsistent with known primary sources.
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The use term “massacre” was not universal among patriots in discussions about
Paoli and Tappan. Terms abound, some masking the event with the phrase “Wayne’s
affair,” seen being used by patriots and British in the Martin Hunter’s memoir. 92
American officers in particular employed the term “affair” 93 when describing Paoli. Major
Francis Menges of the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment, in giving testimony for Wayne’s
court martial, called the battle “the affair of the 20th.”94 Anthony Wayne also called his
loss at Paoli “last Nights Affair.”95 Others, from British officer John André to delegate to
the Continental Congress George Ross, used military terms like “Surprize” and
“Action.”96 As with the use of “affair” or military descriptors like “action,” the term
“massacre,” when used, was employed by both British and patriot sympathizers.
Baurmeister observed that the British at Paoli “deployed so fast they massacred it.” 97
Communications sent by Dr. William Shippen Jr. of the Continental Hospital include
casualty returns from Paoli, in which the communique describes the wounded as
“General Wayne’s Division massacred at Paoli.”98 A lack of a unified description of the
battle should not, however, connote a dearth of emotional responses. Patriots used a
variety of terms to justify retributive violence in the wake of Paoli and Tappan.
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Justification for retribution became an important response to the propaganda
on Paoli and Tappan. Calls for retribution emerged in two varieties. American soldiers
created battle cries intended to inspire fury towards the British. The most used battle cry
was the call to “Remember Paoli” or “Remember Wayne’s affair” or other modifications
on remembrance. Martin Hunter recalled several such shouts during later battles during
his revolutionary war service. At the Battle of Germantown on October 4th, 1777, before
firing at the British line patriots shouted, “Revenge Wayne’s affair!” 99 Hunter was aware
that Anthony Wayne led the forward column of this attack, and he expected some
degree of vengeance from the American troops under him. Hunter mused that if they
had fallen victim to a surprise attack the night before battle, he was confident that “we
should all have been bayonetted.” 100 Propagandized battle inspired Americans long
after the immediate aftermaths of Paoli and Tappan. John Robert Shaw claimed that
calls of “Remember Paola [sic] and the massacre of Lady Washington’s light horse at
Tapaan [sic]” provided inspiration to soldiers and officers alike at the Battle of Stony
Point in 1779.101 These calls acted as reminders to patriots of the perceived barbarity of
British soldiers during the battles of Paoli and Tappan. It offered license for retribution
against the British. Martin Hunter understood this retributive desire, and expected no
quarter given at Germantown.
Propaganda born from the battles of Tappan and Paoli also included claims that
the British were unwilling to take prisoners during the battles. The patriot Colonel Adam
Hubley who was present at Paoli remembered British soldiers shouting, “no quarters!” 102
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Other reports claimed the British only took prisoners begrudgingly, as John Shaw wrote,
“to preserve…some appearance of clemency, 43 were admitted prisoners of war [at
Tappan].”103 The American surgeon Dr. David Griffith, who recorded the injuries of
Tappan survivors, claimed that “very few, or none of the British Officers entered the
quarters of our Troops on this occasion, that no stop might be put to the Rage and
Barbarity.”104 Griffith claims there would have been no prisoners taken, had a British
officer not “had the feelings of remorse & ventured to disobey his Orders” and given
quarter to the “4th troop.”105 Reports of the volume of prisoners taken at both Tappan
and Paoli discussed earlier show that the British clearly had an interest in capturing
prisoners. However, in this case as in others in propaganda, the validity of the claims
did not matter as much as the belief in their veracity.
In response to the growing perception that the British offered no quarter to
patriots, Americans fought viciously, intending to take fewer prisoners in return and to
enact revenge on British soldiers. Inspired by the memory of Paoli, patriots at
Germantown attacked the British light infantry with furious abandon. Wayne’s officers
attempted to “save many of the Poor Wretches who were Crying for Mercy – but to little
purpose.” Wayne’s soldiers, he wrote, “Remembering the Action of the Night of the 20th
Sepr. Near the Warren – pushed on with their Bayonets – and took Ample Vengeance
for that Nights Work.”106 Adam Hubley, present at both Paoli and Germantown, wrote
that Wayne’s troops had retaliation on their minds, “Justice call'd for retaliation, and we
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paid in the same Coin that we received on the bloody Night.” 107 With the memory of
Paoli on their mind the Americans “shew'd them No quarter and without distinguishon
put their Bayonets, thro’ all ye came across, at the same time reminding them of thier
Inhumanity on that Night.”108
Witnessing American refusal to give quarter, nearly 100 British soldiers
barricaded themselves in a mansion near the battlefield, and defended it without cease,
well aware that surrender meant death.109 The fear those 100 British felt during the
battle of Germantown was akin to the fear the propaganda around Paoli and Tappan
fostered. The battle cry created to remind patriots of the cruelty of Paoli and Tappan, as
well as the perception that the British took no prisoners, gave justification for American
soldiers to commit similar atrocities as those committed at the massacres. Inspired by
this propaganda, patriots likely fought with more ferocity out of a greater fear of death; in
their new perception, surrender equated to death.

Conclusion
The bloody conflicts at Tappan and Paoli are bleak reminders of the gory reality
of warfare, especially the gruesome nature of close combat. When investigating these
massacres, they provide intriguing insight into the propaganda and military value of
defining and committing massacres. Officers and soldiers loyal to either side of the
conflict witnessed the terrible potential of Charles Grey’s surprise night raids, and either
adopted the practice, or continued to develop its use. Along with tactical knowledge,
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propaganda was born out of the gore of Paoli and Tappan. The tales of horror, fictional
or true, inspired Americans to fight with fervor, rationalizing extreme retributive violence
using Paoli and Tappan as their justification. It is likely that other massacres, in the
American Revolution and a broader historical context, result in similar phenomena.
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Chapter 3. “My Fellow Slaves”: Identity, Faith, and Space in the Construction of
American Slave Communities in Algiers, 1785 to 1796.
In 1589 Damian Montenegro lay captive in a prison cell in Constantinople. He
was a Christian slave in the service of Ottoman privateers, unable to return to his home
in Ragusa without ransom. Montenegro, not content to remain a slave, plotted his
escape. Come summer, he would return to a galley with dozens of other slaves – there
he and his co-conspirators would revolt. With the aid of Orazio Acquaviva Romano and
Nicolo Rizzo, two men of different national and lingual backgrounds, Montenegro
convinced 500 captives in two separate galleys to reclaim their freedom. They collected
weapons while stationed at different Mediterranean ports and replaced their restraints
with faulty ones to free themselves. On a prearranged date, the conspirators revolted,
reportedly killing 300 “Turks” in the process. Having taken their prizes, they rowed for
Barcelona, and found their freedom.110
Mediterranean slave cooperation over cultural and linguistical lines was not
limited to the sixteenth century, during the height of Early Modern Mediterranean
slavery and piracy. In October 1793, American captive John Foss reported a similar, if
smaller-scaled attempt at freedom. Fourteen Christian “slaves of different nations,”
living in the bagnios of Algiers, “made an attempt to run away with a boat, but were
finally overtaken after they were several leagues at sea, and brought back to Algiers.” 111
Two agitators were executed, and the remaining twelve received the serious
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punishment of “five hundred bastinadoes each,” blows of a cane to the sole of feet, and
an additional fifty pounds of chain added to each prisoners leg along with a seventy
pound wooden block, to be carried “for life.” They continued to bear this punishment
when Foss departed Algiers with his freedom in 1796. 112 Foss bemoaned the “miserable
situation” of his co-religionists and “brother sufferers”– he imagined the descriptions of
slavery, abuse, and death in his work to be equal to the “records of hell.”113
Christian captives, enslaved in bagnios (slave prisons), galleys, and palaces,
constructed communities and forged new bonds with other enslaved peoples. North
African corsairs only captured Christians, and as such the slave population in major
ports like Algiers was exclusively Christian. Historian Daniel Hershenzon notes that the
frequent mobility of Mediterranean slaves allowed them to forge connections with
individuals of varied religious, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. That is not to say
antagonism between confession, country, and language was removed upon capture.
Robert Davis documents the prevalence of “regular brawls between varying contingents
of Spanish, Portuguese, French, [and] Italians” in bagnio life – with religion, politics, and
language frequently kindling conflict.114 However, these brawls seemed to have waned
by the late eighteenth century, as no American captive recorded any cross-national
skirmish in captivity.115 Historian Christine Sears, examining community involvement of
Americans in Algerian and West Saharan slave communities, asserts that Americans

112

Foss, Journal of the captivity and Suffering, 32
Foss, Journal of the captivity and Suffering, 38.
114
Robert Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the
Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 112-113
115
Christine Sears, American Slaves and African Masters: Algiers and the Western Sahara,
1776-1820 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 37
113

38
created transnational relationships in Barbary captivity. However, cramped bagnio
conditions were as likely to foster conflict as they were to foster community. She
contends that, while black and African slaves in the U.S. “greatly valued their social and
religious ties,” Americans in Barbary captivity hoped for a “temporary enslavement” and
“focused their energy on surviving and being ransomed, rather than building and
maintaining families or religious connections.”116 Further, European and American
slaves adhered to preexisting categories based on nationality and class, and resisted
identification perceived others.117
The existence of both community and conflict, then, is widely noted by historians.
Less studied is how these slave communities were constructed despite conflicting
nationality and religion. 118 With the mass introduction of Americans from 1785 to 1793
into the centuries-old system of Mediterranean slavery in Algiers, how did they construct
community among themselves and other Christian captives? I contend that identity,
faith, and space played an essential role in the inclusion and exclusion of Americans
and Europeans in Algerian slave communities. The influence of identity, faith, and
space in community creation can be examined clearly in American slave narratives
written by James Cathcart and John Foss. The captives’ personal understandings of
self in relation to slavery, shared identity, and experiences as “Christian slaves” fostered
community. Catholic orders provided charity, rest, and stability to all Christian captives
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and demonstrated how Christians ought to survive in slavery. Shared spaces, whether
bagnios, taverns, or workplaces, also fostered community by offering slaves opportunity
to relax, sympathize, and resist enslavement together. Through the publication of these
narratives, which were influenced by the cooperation of Americans with Europeans in
Algerian slavery, enslaved Americans and American readers at home saw the need for
Christian solidarity against a new Muslim rival.

Mediterranean Slavery and the Introduction of Americans
Christian and Muslim people played a centuries old role in the system of
Mediterranean slavery in the early modern era. Through raids or piracy, Christian and
Muslim raiders captured individuals of the opposing faith and forced them into slavery
as oarsmen on galleys, laborers at bagnios in major ports, servants in palaces, or
personal attendants to individuals. Mediterranean slaves typically remained in contact
with their families and communities while enslaved through letter writing. 119 Additionally,
Christian slaves could own property, collect money, and achieve an elevated political
status. By 1800, slavery in the Muslim world was still understood as temporary,
religiously based, and political, whereas slavery in North and South America was
defined as permanent, racial, and economic.120 The distinction between these styles of
slavery, and the freedom permitted to white slaves in Muslim captivity, should not
degrade the horror of forced servitude in either situation. Christian and Muslim slaves in
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the Mediterranean were bereft of freedom, forced into grueling labor, and subject to
deplorable punishments and living conditions.
Americans were largely unacquainted with the Mediterranean system of slavery,
although exposed to tales of “Barbary captivity” through novels and sermons, with
notable contributions from Joshua Gee in 1680 and Cotton Mather in 1703. 121 Following
the Revolution, America sought new trade partners in the Mediterranean. 122 Americans
witnessed a spike in captures after losing the protection of the Anglo-Algerian treaty of
1682, which permitted English subjects to roam the Mediterranean without fear of North
African corsairs.123 As American captivity narratives returned home in the form of letters
and autobiographies, American readers became enthralled with authentic and fictional
accounts of North African slavery. 124 North African privateers captured some thirty-five
American ships between 1785 and 1815. Algerian-based corsairs accounted for twentytwo of these abductions. In total, some 130 U.S. sailors were held in North Africa from
1785 to 1796.125 Most of the Americans captured by Algerians from 1785 and 1796
became state-owned slaves, forced into hard labor or servitude at the Dey’s (North
African ruler) palace. Interchangeably described as slaves or captives, Americans in
North Africa suffered until 1796, when the U.S. and Algerian governments agreed to a
treaty, and the surviving Americans returned home.
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Among those 130 sailors were James Leander Cathcart and John Foss, the
former captured in 1785 and the latter in 1793. Both Cathcart and Foss wrote
autobiographical accounts of their captivity in later-published journals. James Cathcart
was born in West Meath, Ireland, on June 1, 1767. During his childhood he was placed
under the care of the sailor Captain John Cathcart, whom he followed to America.
Cathcart spent some time with the US navy as a midshipman aboard the US frigate
Confederacy.126 While serving as a sailor aboard the Maria of Boston, an American
merchant vessel, Cathcart was captured by Algerian-based corsairs on July 25, 1785.127
Cathcart was just 17 when captured, and 28 when released. Cathcart originally
composed a journal during his captivity, and later edited portions of the journal to
compose a cohesive narrative. 128Although this work was compiled and published by his
daughter Jane Cathcart in 1899, Cathcart’s hoped to portray himself in his letters and
memoir as an industrious diplomat. Although absent of academic diplomatic
accreditation, Cathcart uses much of his work to describe foreign affairs and his
interactions with foreign diplomats. Cathcart, later in his captivity, became the highestranking enslaved Christian in Algiers, and after his enslavement, serves several posts
as an American diplomat.129 Cathcart hoped not only to display his abilities as a
politician, but to present the Algerian landscape as a beautiful, prosperous place,
inhabited by cruel and undeserving government and people. Cathcart believed that
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Algiers was "one of the most beautiful [places] in the world” and “if this country [was]
blessed with a good government which would promote the welfare of its subjects and
encourage agriculture, arts and manufactures, it would become in a very few years a
perfect paradise” and an economic powerhouse. 130
John Foss’s journal is far less self-serving in its ambitions. Foss’s childhood and
origins are not as clear as Cathcart’s but he too served as a mariner aboard an
American merchant vessel. Foss departed aboard the Polly from Newburyport,
Massachusetts, and was captured on 25 August 1793, by Algerian corsairs some 35
leagues west of Cape St. Vincent. 131 Like Cathcart, Foss recorded his tribulations in a
journal, which he later edited into a published narrative in 1798. Foss’s believed that his
captivity demonstrated to him that Algerian people were “taught by their religion to treat
the Christian Captives with unexampled cruelty.”132 Foss emphasized the cruelty,
tyranny, and senseless violence of Algerian slavery, and hoped to teach readers that
Muslim North Africans were barbarous and lacking humanity. In contrast, he elevated
white Americans as a “race of men endowed with superior souls.” 133
Both Foss and Cathcart were at least nominally Protestant. Cathcart’s faith is
evidenced by a rejected invitation to convert from a Catholic slave. 134 Further evidence
of Cathcart’s Protestantism is seen when he argued with a slave-master by
distinguishing Protestant Americans from Catholic Maltesers. Cathcart claimed that
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Americans should not suffer for Muslim enslavement at the hand of the Order of St.
John because they practiced a “different religion.” 135 Foss’s religious persuasion is less
clearly defined, but his faith may be evidenced by his mocking of Catholic slaves. He
claimed that Catholics were “exasperated,” being taught that “they are the only true
Christians,” witnessed the liberation of protestant Americans and Dutch and exclaimed,
“why…are true Christians, unnoticed, by our country … while the Protestants, … are
daily emancipated, and are not suffered to wear the yoke of slavery?” 136 He added that
they lamented that Protestants “set examples of humanity” instead of Catholic
governments.137 The veracity of these statements beside, Foss conflated the Americans
with Protestantism, and further described Catholics as “they.”
Cathcart and Foss’s narratives are emphasized here for several reasons. To
start, Foss and Cathcart provide the only two substantial accounts of American captivity
in Algiers from 1785 to 1796. Letters are useful as a supplement, but they often focus
on personal discomfort. Algerian captivity provides a unique experience for American
captives, as they were forced to share their experiences with unfamiliar Europeans of
various religious, national, and lingual backgrounds in a population-dense environment.
Other American captives taken in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth
century were either owned as personal slaves in the Sub-Sahara and lived separate
from the interaction with other Europeans and Americans, or were imprisoned alongside
countrymen in short-term wartime captivity.138 Finally, Cathcart and Foss were both
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multilingual, allowing them to converse with various slave groups. Cathcart claims he
understood French and Spanish, while Foss spoke French.139 These conditions created
an intriguing environment for cross-cultural exchange and cooperation, and these
sources provide an optimal lens to view that cooperation.
In addition to personal narratives, many American slaves wrote to American
newspapers and political officials. American slaves’ only route to freedom was through
ransom or religious conversion. To win this ransom they wrote letters home describing
their experiences, hoping to persuade the American government and populace to aid
them. Although English Barbary captivity narratives existed for two-hundred years prior
to their explosion in popularity in the eighteenth century, the new enslavement of
American seamen alarmed and horrified the Early Republic. 140 Between the publication
of John Foss’s story in 1798 and James Riley’s 1817 narrative, American publishers
printed “over a hundred American Barbary captivity editions.”141 American audiences
“learned about the sufferings of their compatriots in captivity from sermons, from efforts
to raise contributions toward ransoms, and from the narratives written by captives who
had returned home.”142
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American slaves, when writing letters to an American audience, hoped to
convince government officials to work faster for their redemption. To do this, personal
accounts emphasize the cruelty of North African slave-masters. As such, the accounts
describe punishment and torture in graphic detail, eager to stir an audience into
sympathy for American “sufferers” in Algiers. These accounts are also heavily
influenced by a post-revolutionary patriotism.143 This patriotic inclination frequently can
present contradictory narratives. For example, in December 1793, the U.S. government
provided a stipend to all American slaves in Algiers.144 Foss claims that “No nation of
Christendom had ever done the like for their subjects in our situation.” 145 He also
claimed that his Algerian masters looked at this singular “example of humanity” with
“admiration.”146 Simultaneously, Foss claims these same slavers laughed at the
mutilation of a Christian slave at work and beat Christians without provocation.147 As
such, historians should rightly call into question the veracity of Algerian praise of U.S.
“humanity,” along with statements in both narratives written in this patriotic sycophancy.
North African slave narratives were also influenced by the popular American Indian
captivity narratives and proto-orientalism.148 Robert Allison argues that Indian slave
stories all displayed a “rough path [that] ended with a glimpse of sublime pleasures,”
143
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meaning, most frequently, freedom and praise. These narratives were meant to
“encourage Americans at home” to behave in with a benevolence that contrasted “the
brutality of Algerians and Arabs”.149

Redemptive Orders, Charity, and Catholic Spaces
For Americans sailors captured from 1785 to 1793, Catholic orders played the
greatest role in fostering community between the new arrivals and Algerian slaves.
Catholic religious orders had been involved in ransom efforts on the Christian-Islamic
frontier since the twelfth century. 150 Outside of Paris in 1198, John of Matha established
the Order of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Captives, better known as the Trinitarians
(or Mathurins in France), the first of the major redemptive orders. 151 Their activities
spread through medieval Castille and France. Later, in 1218 in Barcelona, Peter
Nolasco and Ramon de Penyafort established the Order of Our Lady of Mercy and the
Redemption of the Captives. 152 These religious orders worked extensively with polities
to raise money and rescue captives in North Africa and the Middle East. Spanish
Trinitarians alone may have rescued as many as 15,573 slaves in the 1600s. 153
Historian Jean Dams estimated that the Trinitarians ransomed more than 100,000
slaves from North Africa and the Middle East from the crusades through the eighteenth
century. Although substantial, the yearly redemption efforts of these orders during the
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peak of white slavery from 1580 to 1680 accounted for only 2 percent of the total
enslaved.154 Despite the paucity of slaves recovered, redemptive orders provided a form
of national pride for French and Iberian monarchs, who projected an image of Christian
protection by supporting and cooperating with ransoming orders. 155 Redemptive orders
also established chapels and hospitals in North African slave bagnios to tend to the
spiritual and physical needs of slaves. Well-funded and staffed bagnio chapels held
masses at least three times a week and included all the trappings of a Catholic
community: devotional confraternities, choruses, Christmas creches, sacraments, and
counseling.156 In the 18th century, Catholic redemptive orders from France, Iberia, and
beyond worked closely with European polities to ransom and care for slaves from their
respective countries. These activities attracted many captive Catholics, who hoped for
ransom and took solace in spiritual guidance.
Recognition of these charitable orders was not limited to Europe. Several
American newspaper reports appeared as early as the 1730s and recounted Trinitarian
and Mercedarian redemption efforts in North Africa. In 1730, a note from Paris in the
Boston Gazette acknowledges a successful Trinitarian redemption from Algiers. 157
Various reports featured in the Boston Weekly Post-Boy in 1749 and the New York
Gazette in 1752 discuss the various pitfalls and successes of redemption efforts and
North African slave life. 158 One notable extract, published in the Philadelphia
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Independent Gazetteer and the Pennsylvania Packet in 1786 notes the redemption and
subsequent ritual procession of French slaves. 159 In this report, the writer mourns the
sorrow of the slaves’ wives, as some had not seen their husbands for thirty years.
Three remarried women, having found their estranged husbands, were struck with
“surprise…as great as their sorrow at the appearance of their former husbands.” 160 The
story remarks that one woman was struck dead with shock. In addition to a familiarity
with the redemptive orders from letters and newspaper reports, the Algerian capture of
American sailors in 1785 drove American diplomats to negotiate directly with the
Trinitarians to organize a ransom. 161 Thomas Jefferson, working with the Trinitarians in
France, requested funds to liberate the American captives, but American logistical
failures and the rise of anti-clericalism in France forced the order to suspend operations
in 1790. Despite these failures, it is possible that some American readers were familiar
with the mission of redemptive orders. The captive Americans in Algiers were both
witnesses and recipients to the charity of redemptive priests. Inspired by their charity,
they spoke highly of priests, and forged bonds with non-American, non-Protestant
clergy, which encouraged interaction with other Catholics.
American-Algerian captivity narratives comment on the charitable assistance of
priests to enslaved Americans. John Foss’s earliest interaction with a Catholic priest in
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Algiers was on his first day, after waiting with his fellow American captives in the Bagnio
Belique.162 After a considerable time of “condoling” their “hapless fate” in the bagnio, a
French priest visited them, and asked if any understood French. He was “answered in
the affirmative” and spoke with Foss and his crew. After speaking, he departed and
returned half an hour later with “two Moors … who brought two baskets full of white
bread, and …gave each man a loaf, weighing nearly a pound, which was a very
delicious meal for us, we having eaten nothing during the day.” 163 The priest informed
the American crew that the Algerians only allowed a small loaf of bread to the slaves on
their first day, and the food he provided was “out of his own pocket.” He concluded his
kindness by saying “if [I] was able, [my] charity would further extend.”164 The quality and
volume of the meal in Foss’s account is of substantial value to understanding the
priest’s assistance. The bread the American captive received later that day from the
Algerians was a much smaller, and poorer quality “small loaf of very black, sour bread
weighing about three ounces and a half.”165 The slaves, from then on, received “three
ounces and [a] half” of bread three times a day. Foss claimed the bread was “so sour,
that a person must be almost starving before he can eat it.”166 Slave letters also mention
the poor quality of slave rations – Thomas Manning’s 1793 letter called the bread “as
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black as ones hat.”167 The priest, in a single donation, gave a crew of Americans more
bread than they would receive in a full day, and the bread was a far better quality. Foss
was immediately taken to appreciating his “kind benefactor” who provided both
information and food for survival.168
American narratives frequently praised of the priests stationed in Algiers.
Cathcart wrote what is essentially a hagiographic account of Father Joseph, a resident
of Algiers for thirty years. Father Joseph accompanied the slaves when the Algerian
government sent them into the countryside to prevent recapture during the Spanish
attacks of 1775 and 1784. 169 Cathcart admired Father Joseph, writing, “This holy man
never abandoned them in these times, he hired mules to accommodate those who were
sick and even dismounted and walked nearly all the way, giving his mule to such of the
slaves whose feet were lacerated…”170 Cathcart noted that the priest donated his last
dollar to bribe to the Algerian wardens, in hope that they would better treat the
Christians. The saintly figure Cathcart portrayed even tended to captives sick with the
plague, falling ill to the disease himself. He also notes that the priest rejected invitations
home, refusing promotion, and instead dedicating his life “to those poor, abandoned,
and dejected creatures.”171 Cathcart concludes his miniature hagiography with a final
touch of veneration: “If I …was worth of obtaining an especial grace from Almighty God,
I would pray to be enabled to be as good a man as Father Joseph; for I can scarcely
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believe there was a better.” 172 Along with the praise of individual priests, Cathcart
complimented the Mercedarians as a whole, recalling, “this is certainly one of the most
charitable and laudable institutions in the world, [as it] extends its benign influence to
Christians of all nations.” 173 Americans, as evidenced in Cathcart’s and Foss’s
narratives, held positive opinions of Catholic priests and their charity. The priests
presented in these narratives tend to Christians of any denomination, and debased
themselves for the wellbeing of a greater Christian community.
American slaves also took advantage of the spaces created and operated by
redemptive orders in Algiers. The principal Christian hospital in Algiers adjoined the
Bagnio Galera. Cathcart noted that the hospital served Christians slaves of “all
denominations” and all patients were “treated all alike, without any distinction, much to
the credit of the priests, surgeon, and apothecary.” 174 Sick slaves were provided raised
wool mattresses, sheets, and pillows – a shocking contrast to the usual sleeping
arrangement of bagnio slaves. According to Foss, slaves were permitted one blanket,
which they kept for the entirety of their captivity, and slept on stone floors or tables with
“neither bed, nor bedding.”175 In addition to providing food and supplies otherwise
refused to slaves, the Catholic hospital allowed slaves who were “not really sick” with a
place to of comfort to “rest a few days.”176 Foss’s chronicle also described priests as
active nursing staff in the hospitals. In addition to tending to the physical and spiritual
needs of captives, the priests and hospital staff attempted to convince Algerian slave
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drivers to wait for patients to fully recover.177 Foss and Cathcart visited the hospital
occasionally to see sick American and European friends. If the hospital had not existed,
Cathcart asserts, American slaves would have “died, either in the street at their labor, or
in some corner in the prison, without any person to assist them or to console them in
their last moments.”178 Along with providing a place for the Christian sick to recuperate
or die comfortably, the hospital served a social function. The hospital building was a
large ward with an altar in the center along with several smaller rooms around the
perimeter. Slaves, both sick and healthy, were present to the faith-based community
activities of daily mass and rosary. 179 Slaves may have also forged bonds with members
of varied backgrounds in the close, safe area of the hospital.
The hospital, however, was not the only space created by Catholic priests that
fostered community. If Foss’s description of Christian burial prior to the purchase of the
cemetery is to be believed, dead slaves in the sixteenth century were “not allowed to be
interred, but were carried out about half a Mile to the eastward of the city, and
precipitated down the banks into the sea.”180 A Catholic priest on a tour of Barbary
North Africa in the seventeenth century witnessed this burial ceremony during a plague.
According to Cathcart, the priest, motivated by a “humane heart” purchased “at an
exorbitant price, about one acre of land for a burial place for Christians.” 181 The burial
site, although by no means a serene place, acted as the interment land for all Christians
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in Algiers since its inception. 182 Cathcart claimed to have been at the burial of every
American at this site, “reading prayers over them, and remaining until they were
decently covered.”183 Cathcart noted that Christians who died in the hospital were
“carried on a bier covered with a pall” to the gravesite. 184 Intriguingly, he made a
distinction between two groups that may accompany these processions “friends or
countrymen.”185 The site operated as a community gathering location to mourn
deceased slaves, both collectively and for national groups. Additionally, Foss’s
knowledge of the tale behind the burial ground belays an interest and appreciation of
the site for its value to Christian slaves.
American slaves interacted with various forms of Catholic redemptive charity and
infrastructure. Foss and Cathcart’s accounts are filled with stories of group ransom,
many of which involved Mercedarians. Further, Cathcart described how the priests
distributed money to impoverished bagnio slaves weekly, or more frequently if the funds
were available.186 Intriguingly, Cathcart also attested that donations were not only

Foss describes the site as follows: “It lies about half a mile westward of the city, where is a
piece of low land or meadow, this is dyked in with a mound to prevent the sea from washing in,
and destroying the produce of the land. The burial ground is between this mound and the sea,
consequently, in a heavy gale of wind, the violence of the waves washes the dead bodies out of
their graves, into the ocean, as the place is nothing more than a sandy beach, and the corps are
seldom buried more than one foot under the sand. According to the records of the nation,
upwards of 98,000 Christians have already been buried here, and scarcely any marks of a burial
ground is to be discovered, more than the great quantities of human bones which are to be seen
laying upon the beach. They keep four slaves whom age has rendered incapable of any other
employment, to bury their deceased companions…” Foss, A Journal of the Captivity and
Sufferings, 55
183
Cathcart, The Captives, 136
184
Cathcart, The Captives, 112
185
Cathcart, The Captives, 112. My emphasis.
186
Cathcart, The Captives, 111
182

54
augmented by foreign powers, local merchants, and consuls, but also “sometimes by
such of the slaves as are in the way of saving money, and are charitably inclined.” 187
Did priestly generosity inspire Christian slaves to act charitably despite personal
suffering? Cathcart strained to mention his personal charity to other slaves. He wrote, “I
believe those who survive will do me the justice to acknowledge, that they never wanted
a good meal while I had it in my power to give it to them.” 188 Later in his autobiography
he praised his charity again upon visiting a Christian owned tavern, where he planned to
buy food and “give some to my unfortunate brother sufferers…as was generally my
custom to do.”189 He also wrote that, in general, the Christian slaves were “liberal to
each other” and “made a merit of assisting our unfortunate brother sufferers, who were
not in as good a situation as ourselves.”190 Cathcart was in frequent contact with priests,
who regularly prayed mass in the bagnios and provided care for the poorest Christian
slaves. Further, Cathcart claimed that he personally financed the coffins of several
American slaves during his slavery.191 Perhaps Cathcart was motivated by the
charitable activities and spaces of the Trinitarians and Mercedarians and roused by the
inspiration of Father Joseph (whom he prayed to emulate). Even if his personal charity
originated from other encouragement, the connection and spaces provided by Catholic
priests encouraged Americans to create community amongst themselves and with
others. Whether visiting a sick acquaintance in the hospital, like his friend Giovanni de
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la Cruz, or participating in the charity of redemptive priests, Americans engaged with
and benefitted from the community fostered by Catholic clergy.

Cultural and Religious Identity
Beyond the role of clergy in community foundation in Algiers, Americans found
unity by bearing the epithet “slave” and “Christian,” and framing their titles in opposition
to Muslim masters. Foss noted the emotional weight of being designated a “slave.”
When he left Algiers, he wrote that slaves not only suffered a “miserable existence,” but
also suffered the “woeful appellation of slave preying upon their mind.”192 Foss’s
imagined connection to men bearing the title “slave” crossed regional and religious
barriers. When his ship stopped at the island of Elba on the return journey to America,
he observed slaves owned by the Duke of Tuscany “employed in fortifying the place,
and cleaning the harbour.” He wrote that these individuals were “kept constantly
chained” and that the “sight of such a number of miserable wretches, doomed to
perpetual slavery, was really affecting.”193 Following this section he included a poem
with the line “the galley-slave with horror struck my soul.”194
Along with imagining and creating connections with other people called “slave,”
all European and American captives were assigned the designation “Christian.”195 When
Foss arrived with his crew he was paraded through Algiers, and among the cheers he
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heard Algerians calling them “Christian dogs,” another epithet cited frequently by Foss
and Cathcart.196 Along with receiving a collective title, the first basis for a collective of
slaves, Foss and Cathcart were berated for their religious identity. Both accounts
recorded various Muslim Algerians denigrating them as “infidel dog[s] without faith,” or
some variation of the phrase, a total of seven times. 197 On one occasion, Cathcart took
exception to a Muslim noble who called him a “dog without faith.” Cathcart responded
by saying “you dare not call me a dog…was I not a captive? … As far as being without
faith I believe in the faith of my forefathers.”198 As can be seen in his response, the
denigration of his faith bothered him more than his station as a slave, although both had
a tremendous effect on the psyche. Foss also includes instances of religious
denigration. After his capture, Foss claimed that the Algerian captain told the crew that
they were to be treated as they deserved, because of their “bigotry and superstition, in
believing in a man who was crucified by the Jews, and disregarding the true doctrine of
God’s last and greatest prophet Mahomet.”199 Marcus Rediker argues that the practice
of religion among Anglo-American was limited and infrequent.200 But the assigning of
titles and degradation of religious identity spurred American captives to adopt the title as
a distinction from their Muslim captors, thereby blunting the distinction between
Catholics and Protestants.
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Personal views on how Christians should survive slavery also encouraged
Americans to forge or reject connection with individuals and groups. In the beginning of
Foss’s narrative he wrote, “all the poor, forlorn, miserable Captive has to do, is to resign
himself up to his fate, and in silence wait for the event.” 201 This resignation did not mean
acceptance, but modest survival. Living as an example of “resignation” was a
requirement for Americans to view other cultural groups as proper “Christian slaves.”
Cathcart after being exposed to the plague for the third time, signed off his letter by
noting that he was “Wholly resigned to the will of God.” 202 Some slaves, especially
former Spanish garrison members from Oran, lived in opposition to this resignation, and
actively defrauded and stole from fellow slaves. The former garrison at Oran contained
adventurers and pressed soldiers from “almost every country in Europe,” including
German, French, Spanish, Italian, English, Swiss, Polish, and Prussian men. 203 Foss
and Cathcart described Oraners as “villains” who opted into their slavery by choice, and
lashed out violently by threatening priests, ambassadors, and fellow slaves. 204 Cathcart,
previously praising the charity and goodness of the Catholic priests in Algiers, observed
that priests were “in danger of their lives.”205 Oran slaves were cast in a negative light in
both accounts because of their lack of Christian dignity. When Cathcart befriended an
individual from the Oran garrison he made sure to note a distinction that separated him
from the typical Oraner. Cathcart claimed he was a cadet, sent to Oran “for some
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irregularity… [and] from whence he deserted in hopes of regaining his liberty.” 206 This
picture is in jarring opposition to Cathcart’s general description of Oraners, who he
described as people who “come into slavery like sheep to the slaughter and are not
captives but voluntary slaves.” 207 Other characters beyond the Oraners acted in a
perceived un-Christian fashion and were rejected from American companionship.
Cathcart met a Spanish woman shortly after his capture aboard whom he described as
“a facetious creature, who seemed perfectly reconciled to her situation, and endeavored
to reconcile every one to theirs.”208 This woman, like the Oraners, was willing to be
enslaved. These individuals were the “others” of Barbary captivity and, in Foss and
Cathcart’s perception, were excluded from proper Christian community.

Bagnios
Christian slaves in Algiers occupied three major spaces: the bagnio, the tavern,
and the workplace – be it a palace, port, graveyard, or office. These locations provided
the backdrop, and occasionally, the impetus to forge relationships in Barbary.
Interestingly, they also provided the stage for conflict. The bagnios Belique, de Gallera,
and Siddi Hamouda were home to a substantial portion of Christian slaves in Algiers.
Whether slaves worked at the city’s quay, tended the Dey’s garden at his palace, or
served at a foreign embassy, many were housed in bagnios for the night. Slave society
in the bagnios was a complex system of classes. In these buildings, slaves held an
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array of economic, social, and occupational rankings. Some Christians, like Cathcart,
were promoted from the slave populace to operate as corporals, clerks, and other
administrative officials. 209 Along with receiving a salary and additional privileges,
Christian officers could own a greater degree of property and received surprising
privileges. The chief clerk, for example, received a separate apartment, complete with
two rooms and a kitchen. 210 Slaves could make money from assigned professions, and
some had the chance to earn additional income by working after labor hours. 211 Bagnio
slaves rented rooms from the Bagnio taskmasters or risked sleeping exposed to the
elements in the center of the open structure. 212 An accurate estimate of the volume of
slaves in any given bagnio is difficult to ascertain. If Foss’s estimate is to be believed,
more than 600 slaves lived in the Bagnio Belique, but Foss, Cathcart, and various
letters mention the frequent ransom and death of slaves that made for a constantly
fluctuating population. 213 These cramped slave prisons, complete with a class structure
and filled with prisoners from a multiplicity of Christian nations and religions, forced
Americans to live with different national, religious, and lingual groups. Christine Sears
argues that proximity played an important role in fomenting conflict among bagnio
slaves, sparking brawls and murders.214 Americans needed to form bonds to learn
about their new environment, and no American was involved in inter-Christian scuffles.
Despite the poor living conditions of the bagnios, Americans may have found

209

Cathcart, The Captives, 50-51; Foss, A Journal of the Captivity and Sufferings, 24
Cathcart, The Captives, 55
211
Foss, A Journal of the Captivity and Sufferings, 74
212
Foss, A Journal of the Captivity and Sufferings, 28-29
213
Foss, A Journal of the Captivity and Sufferings, 18;"Extract of a Letter from William Penrose,
Late Master of the Ship President, Belonging to Philadelphia, Dated Algiers." Aurora General
Advertiser (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 1296, February 2, 1795: [3].
214
Sears, American Slaves and African Masters, 50-53
210

60
collaborators in the space of the bagnio – as it was there that Christian slaves spent
most non-work hours.
Taverns
The tavern, a structure recognized for its importance in cultivating community,
also contributed to fostering unity among Algerian slaves. Each bagnio kept its own
tavern, converting the bottom floor of the multi-floored structures into taverns by
constructing tables, kitchens, and storage for alcohol. 215 These bagnio taverns were all
“kept by Christian slaves who [paid] their rent and very high duties for permission to sell
liquors and provisions” to Christian slaves and visitors, including Muslim locals. 216
These taverns also served food, and offered a venue for local Algerians and slaves to
commune. Bagnio taverns also operated as a sleeping spot for slaves unable to pay the
rent for covered apartments in the bagnio. 217 Bagnio tavern keeps, and likely their
workers, paid for the privilege to avoid hard labor, and remained working at the tavern
all day.218
Historian Vaughn Schribner argues for the importance of tavern culture and the
creation of an American revolutionary culture. Taverns provided essential “food, drink,
and camaraderie” to white Americans in the 18th century.219Anthropologists have also
noted the importance of taverns – indeed, “drinking may operate to cement friendships
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and produce ties and feelings of solidarity between individuals who have different social
positions within a community.”220 Further, taverns and pubs operated as an “important
social institution for producing interlocking ties and thereby increasing social
cohesion.”221 In addition to this general cohesion, some taverns in American and British
localities became associated with particular social groupings; when this occurred,
taverns smoothed over “social divisions” within a community, but also “enhanced the
differences between … social groups.” 222 Taverns in eighteenth century America
catered to specific classes and social groupings, and numbered as many as one tavern
for every 100 to 130 residents in major cities.223 Although taverns in Algiers were not
exclusively for Christians, they operated at ratio of one tavern per 66 slaves, plentiful
enough to support unique Christian social groups and classes – with around twentyseven to thirty taverns in and outside of bagnios operated by 50 to 90 slaves. 224
However, Cathcart provided no explicit description of group exclusivity in taverns, and
brawls between slaves from the Spanish garrison at Oran occurred in various
taverns.225
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Along with food, taverns sold alcohol and tobacco, and provided a venue for local
Algerians and slaves to commune and perform. Cathcart and Foss cited the attendance
of Algerians, Turks, and other visitors from the port or the city visiting the taverns.
Alcohol and tobacco purchases from local visitors and Christian slaves in Cathcart’s
taverns alone contributed to a substantial salary. 226 The tavern at the Bagnio de Belique
was so filled with smoke upon Cathcart’s visit that it was “nearly impervious to the
view.”227 These tavern were popular locations to smoke, drink, and relax after labor or
on Fridays, when slaves were occasionally permitted a day of respite. 228 Cathcart also
wrote that a variety of instruments could be heard from the taverns. Songs of various
instruments and languages poured from the taverns. Cathcart recalled the sounds of “a
triboocca, a tabor or quinterra, and a guitar and sometimes a fiddle and Turkish guitar,
and not infrequently an Italian mandolin and Spanish guitar, each singing or rather
shouting in different languages.” 229 Although these locations were also the site of
brawls, as Cathcart reminded the reader, the functions of drink, tobacco, music, and
camaraderie contributed to a general cohesion among Christian slaves.
Besides providing drink, food, and song, taverns also served as establishments
in which Christian slaves supported each other. Cathcart, who later became owner and
operator of “the Mad House Tavern, … half a tavern in the Bagnio Gallera, and another
in Bagnio Liddi Hamuda” provided free food and drink to Americans in need during his
captivity.230 The thirty taverns in Algiers also supported an estimated 200 of the “most
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indigent” Christian slaves. Without the support of these taverns, Cathcart was certain
that these slaves “would in all probability starve for want of food, as it would be
impossible for them to live long upon the allowance…from the Regency.” 231 Taverns,
and some who owned and visited them, provided an essential communal and
philanthropic function by providing sustenance to poor slaves.
Finally, along with providing food, drugs, music, camaraderie, and charity,
taverns functioned as a central location of slave resistance in Algiers. Cathcart, upon
viewing and participating in these forms of resistance and collaboration, imagined a
connection between himself and other resisting slaves. The first notable form of tavern
resistance in Cathcart’s narrative occurred when he became inebriated at the Mad
House tavern. An Algerian noble requested Cathcart to forfeit his chair, and Cathcart,
“aided by a glass or two of wine,” refused, telling him “I [am] in my own house.” 232
Cathcart then threatened to cut off his ears, and engaged in a theological discussion in
which he tried to prove his knowledge of Islam. Cathcart claimed that the ensuing
argument drew the attention of all Christians in the tavern, and the noble forgot his
threat to remove his ears in the shouting. His argument was misinterpreted, and the
noble assumed him to be a crypto-Muslim. In response, Cathcart attempted to bribe the
Christian and Muslim tavern goers who were present. Nothing negative came from this
episode, but Cathcart was terrified by the idea of him becoming a renegade or being
misinterpreted as an apostate by the Algerian government. He had, however, resisted
his slavers by arguing and threatening.
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A second notable episode of resistance occurred in 1796, when two (likely drunk)
Spanish slaves from Oran fought in the Bagnio de Gallera. One of the slaves, Domingo
Gomez, stabbed the other five times. The Christian corporals of the bagnio attempted to
disarm him but were stabbed in the process. The city guard was called, but Gomez
maintained control over the prison for three hours, “armed only with despair and a
common Dutch knife.”233 A fellow Oran slave with whom Gomez had “no suspicion”
surprised Gomez, knocking him down with a club. The “cowardly” guards then captured
Gomez. They beat him, from Cathcart’s perspective, “most cruelly and treated him when
a prisoner most unmercifully.” 234 Cathcart, intriguingly, lamented Gomez’s failure,
calling him “a man of some education, and before this affair was esteemed a good
man.”235 Further, he claimed to capture Gomez’s final lamentations – Gomez cried out,
regretting that he “had not sacrificed all those villains who had caused his despair –
especially the traitor who had knocked him down.” 236 In this narrative of resistance,
Cathcart grieved the loss of Gomez, an instigator and murderer, rather than the loss of
two Christian slaves with whom he fought. Gomez became a hero in this small portion
of Cathcart’s story, and Cathcart described the Oraner who subdued Gomez a “traitor.”
Cathcart imagined himself as an ally of Gomez in a resistance effort prompted by
inebriation.
After this episode, the Algerian Dey demanded that the tavern keepers pay a fine
of 2,000 sequins for the lost slaves, “for if they had not sold intoxicating liquors they
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would not have quarreled.”237 The punishment for refusal or inability to pay would result
in a severe beating and the loss of all property. Cathcart, who “endeavored to intercede
for those poor people” collaborated with the owners of the twenty-five taverns in Algiers,
and designed a deal by which the taverns could avoid the heavy fine by paying an
additional monthly fee of five sequins. Additionally, Cathcart offered his person and
property as security for the taverns’ monthly fee. Cathcart’s collaboration allowed the
less prosperous taverns in Algiers to continue operation. Taverns, then, supported
community and collaboration beyond the camaraderie of socializing, drinking, and
resisting; they also made a collective of tavern owners that worked together to continue
their business.
It is important to note that Islamic prohibitions on alcohol consumption were not
universal at the turn of the eighteenth century. For example, scholars have noted that
although alcohol consumption by Muslims was forbidden in the Ottoman Empire in the
sixteenth-century, wine consumption was an important part of courtly tradition in the
Iranian-influenced world. 238 Further, Christian and Jewish subjects of Muslim polities
were typically permitted to continue their production and consumption of alcohol if they
paid a tax.239 Algiers was a nationally diverse city, which likely included Muslims who
either skirted prohibition, or did not believe it essential for their personal faith.
Scholarship on the legal status of alcohol in 18th century Algiers is limited. But through
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Cathcart’s narrative, it seems as though Muslims visited Christian operated bars to
purchase alcohol and tobacco, as they may have been the only institutions that sold
alcohol in Algiers.

Workplace Community
Finally, the workplaces occupied by slaves forced various groups to work, suffer,
and identify with one another, effectively imposing a community on them. Daniel
Hershenzon argues that the constant change in workspace within the Mediterranean
slave environment forced them continually to forge new connections with various
slaves.240 Foss, likely because his work remained at the British embassy and at the
quay, did not mention work relationships. Cathcart, however, frequently met new work
associates, and described his positive view of them. For example: Cathcart was forced
to serve as apprentice to a “genteel looking” Spanish carpenter. 241 Cathcart noted that
for eight months he constantly accompanied this carpenter, whom he described as the
“best house carpenter in the Regency,” having “applied himself to learn the trade he
was put on.”242
Along with forcing slaves to cooperate, the Algerian slave workplace encouraged
slaves to sympathize and bond with each other through suffering. Foss and Cathcart
repeatedly described injuries, mistreatment, and death among non-American slaves in
Algiers. Foss recalled two separate work-related slave accidents in 1794. The second
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accident resulted in the death of a Corsican slave, whose “legs and knees” were
“crushed in such a manner, that it was impossible to distinguish one part from
another.”243 His father, brothers, and sons with whom he was captured witnessed this
Corsican’s death. Foss reflected, “This melancholy event, deprived a father of his son,
six unhappy men of a brother, three children of a father, and a woman of her husband.
In addition to the horrors of slavery, these miserable relatives were left to bemoan the
untimely death of the unfortunate sufferer.”244 Along with accidents, Christian slaves
sympathized with the punishment received by other slaves during work. Foss recalled
two Americans being beaten “without hesitation” for sitting during work hours, and
Cathcart claimed to have witnessed the beating of palace slaves for “mere trifles, such
as speaking loud, procrastinating…or speaking to any of the cooks or the Christians in
the garden, and on a thousand other pretenses.” 245 American accounts wrote about
punishments, and the punishers, as “tyrants” who punished violently and without
reason. Both the portrayal of the punishers and the slaves show that American slaves
imagined a bond among slaves that was forged by suffering. The fruit of this sympathy
was recognized by the enslaved; Cathcart himself believed that “shared adversity”
allowed friendships to be “heighten’d” in Algerian captivity. 246

Conclusion
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Community creation among slaves, and the literature made by enslaved
Americans who experienced these communities, may have altered American
understanding of Christian solidarity in the Atlantic world. Prior to American captivity in
North Africa in the 1780s and 1790s, American magazines, novels, and newspapers
published literature that had not yet become tainted with orientalism. For Americans,
Muslims were not yet obscure “others.” But by the 1790s American sense of “self” and
“other” transformed.247 With the proliferation of slave narratives, Muslims became a
rival. This much has already been recognized by historian Robert Battistini, but the
cooperation of formerly enslaved Americans and Europeans adds another layer to this
rivalry. Americans, formerly ambivalent, joined the rhetoric of a Christian alliance in
opposition to North African pirates that had been in European circulation since the
seventeenth century. 248
In his early enslavement, Cathcart believed that Americans were separate from
religious conflict between Muslim and Christian Europeans. Cathcart argued with an
Algerian slaver, who recently returned from a 14-year captivity in Malta, that Americans
should not suffer for “injuries [the slaver] had received in Malta… [as Malta is] situated
at the distance of 6,000 miles from my country and were likewise a different religion,
which taught them from time immemorial to view the Mahometans with enmity.” 249
Cathcart suggested that there had never been a Muslim in America, and that the US
had never been in any conflict with a Muslim nation. The slave master, per Cathcart,
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villainously “curl[ed] his whiskers,” and responded “true…but you are Christians and if
you have not injured Mussulmen it was not for the want of will, but for want of power.” 250
Cathcart threatened that the US would “retaliate upon those who treat their unfortunate
citizens with undeserved cruelty.” 251 Cathcart’s argument here presented a
transformation. Americans were formerly friendly and uninterested in the affairs of
Muslim-Christian conflict, but the mistreatment of Americans prompted a response.
Foss’s narrative is filled with calls of Christian vengeance. Foss included several
poems that call for a violent response against North African corsairs; “Revenge!
revenge! the voice of nature cries/ Awake to glory, and to vengence rise!” Further,
Foss’s poetry is imbued with sacred tones. Conflict against Algiers was not only a
necessary act of vengeance, but it was “GOD himself” who “commands” Americans to
“Save human nature from such deadly harms,/ By force of reason, or by force of
Arms.”252 Foss also included a poem in his conclusion, titled “The Algerine Slave,” that
calls “Columbia” to “unsheathe thy glitt'ringsword/ Ride on and conquer—speak, O
speak the word.”253 In this poem, Algiers, the “scourge of Christians,” is transformed into
“barren plain” by Christian revenge.254
Although Foss’s poetry focused on a sacred American military response,
Christian unity in the bagnios was echoed by imagined Christian unity against Islam at
home. Newspapers published a variety of letters in the 1780s to 1810s that praised
Christian victories and lamented Christian defeat against North African corsairs. An
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extract published in the Boston-based Herald of Freedom in 1790 praised the crew of a
Papal coastguard vessel, which was defeated by Algerian corsairs only after a “brave
and gallant resistance” that inflicted extensive Algerian casualties. 255 A second notable
extract in 1794 relayed a Sardinian victory over two “Barbary zebecks,” in which the
Christians were able to capture a vessel and 92 Algerian sailors. The writer was
pleased that the Sardinians “happily” avoided greater casualties. 256 In 1798, a stunning
battle that reads like a Crusade epic, was relayed via letter. The extract claimed that in
November, 1797, a fleet commanded by a “noble knight of Malta” engaged a fleet led by
the “daring infidel” Aza. 257 The battle was narrated with much spectacle, as both
commanders dramatically inflicted mortal wounds on the other, and both fleets struggled
until every ship sunk. Invoking crusading imagery, the letter played on the growing
desire to destroy a new Muslim nemesis with the help of Christian allies.
Identity, space, and religion played a significant part in creating slave
communities among varied Christian groups in Algerian slavery. The cooperation of
Christian slaves, and the discussion of slaves cooperation in America, contributed to a
desire for Christian solidarity.
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